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Abstract 
 
 This thesis examines the link between regime type and healthcare systems. After 
reviewing literature that examines regime type, social spending, and healthcare, as well 
as a more specific example of regime change in Chile, it undertakes a multivariate 
regression analysis of 183 countries. It concludes that democracies have significantly 
better healthcare-system indicators, but that environmental variables, such as Latitude 
and Percentage of Rural Population, are more significant predictors of healthcare. It 
concludes that, while regime type is an important factor, dealing with ecological and 
locational problems of a country, such as combating tropical diseases and expanding 
access to infrastructure, are statistically more likely to affect the size, scope, and efficacy 
of a country’s healthcare system. 
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Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
Democracies and dictatorships should be as different from each other as night is 
from day, given their different philosophies of governing. Although there is certainly 
variation among the two different types and many outliers, one would expect them to 
behave differently and have different ideologies, particularly relating to the use of state 
power and the importance of civil liberties and political rights. However, it is important 
to investigate how these different types of governments fare in meeting the needs of their 
citizens in order to understand each regime type better and the consequences for their 
citizens. Are citizens of democracies better-off than citizens of authoritarian regimes 
because of the inherent character of the government? In particular, does being a 
democracy have implications for the health of its citizens? 
Indeed, studying this certain aspect of the relationship between regime type and 
health is critical, not only to general scholarship but to our understanding of how to 
improve healthcare systems of countries and health outcomes of populations. If 
correlations exist between health and regime type, it gives even more reason to insist on 
the demise of regimes that abuse the political rights and civil liberties of their 
populations. However, if none exists, the uncomfortable prospect of working with any 
regime in power, no matter how repressive, in order to focus on more important factors 
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involved in changing health and healthcare systems might be shown to be a sound 
alternative. 
This thesis will explore some of the ways the difference in regime type plays out, 
particularly in regard to health and health outcomes. I will ask two questions. First, is 
there a relationship between regime type and healthcare systems? And, secondly, are 
there other factors that more significantly affect healthcare systems than the political 
factor of the quality of the regime? 
To answer these questions, I will first undertake a short review of the relevant 
literature connecting social spending and health to the political regime type, followed by 
hypotheses specifically addressing this relationship on a global level. I will test these with 
a multivariate regression analysis of 183 countries, seeing how several healthcare system 
indicators respond to democratic and competing variables. I will also relate the discussion 
of the literature and the results to the experiences of Chile, the site of my study abroad 
experience. Discussing the recent experience of Chile makes a nice addition to this thesis 
because it complements the broad, international analysis, discussing the overall results in 
the perspective of a country that has had recent experience with two very different regime 
types. 
 
Literature Review 
Although not much literature exists connecting regime type to healthcare, there 
exists some scholarship about social spending on a more general level that can shed light 
on my questions. One important research agenda details and analyzes the relationship 
between regime type, in this case dictatorship and democracy, and social spending. First, 
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on a more theoretical level, Bruce Buena de Mesquita (2002), a prominent political 
scientist, made an argument based on selectorate theory. He started with two objectives: 
first, to “examine how political institutions influence the incentives of leaders to allocate 
resources toward the provision of public goods…and private goods” and, second, to 
“identify the institutional circumstances in which the incentives facing a leader who 
wants to stay in office are compatible with the provision of effective public policy” 
(2002: 559). He and his co-authors identified two specific variables that they think 
influence the provision of public and private goods, size of the selectorate, S, and the size 
of the winning coalition, W. The selectorate they defined as “those in society who hold 
the power to remove the incumbent and select her replacement,” while the winning 
coalition is defined as those whose loyalty the leader must hold to stay in power (Buena 
de Mesquita 2002: 561).  The relative sizes of each, they said, change with the type of 
political system: autocracies usually have small winning coalitions relative to their 
selectorates, while democracies have large ones. Public goods they defined as goods that 
benefit all members of the population equally (like clean air and national defense), while 
private goods specifically benefit those to whom the good is given (defense contracts and 
corruption payments, for example). 
The authors created a mathematical model to test specifically how the size of W 
within S affects the way a leader, L, stays in power through the provision of public and 
private benefits. They reviewed many scenarios and examined how leaders make 
decisions, given varying sizes of S and W. They come to several conclusions. First, they 
conclude that “it is easier for autocrats (leaders with small coalitions) to survive in office 
than democrats (leaders with large coalitions)”, noting that this difference “stems from 
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differences in the relative importance of private and public goods” (Buena de Mesquita 
2002: 580). Autocrats, who by definition of regime type have smaller winning coalitions, 
can more effectively buy the support of W by providing private benefits. Democrats, 
however, would soon go bankrupt to try to retain their winning coalition this way, as W is 
so large: thus, public goods are a more efficient method for their political survival. 
Indeed, they also came to a conclusion about institutions in general. “In particular, 
because democrats rely on large winning coalitions, they must provide more public goods 
than those who depend on small winning coalitions” (Buena de Mesquita 2002: 581). 
Although the authors do not specifically mention healthcare, this research has huge 
implications for my questions. Democratic and authoritarian leaders should approach 
healthcare differently based on their preferences for providing public and private goods; 
democrats would be more likely to provide large-scale public healthcare systems, a 
public good, while authoritarians would more likely prioritize spending for private 
benefits, like a healthcare system only accessible to the political and social elite. 
Another set of scholars set about to look at this relationship more from the results, 
rather than motivation for social spending. Pribble, Huber, and Stephens (2009) looked at 
countries in Latin America to examine what they call the determinants of poverty. Highly 
critical of the Washington Consensus1 and a growth-based approach to looking at poverty 
reduction, they instead looked at the influence of politics and “domestic political factors 
such as the nature of parties, regime type, and the institutional structure of the state” 
(Pribble et al. 2009: 389).  They hypothesized that the “ideal-typical political sequence,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  trend	  embraced	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  promoting	  liberalization	  of	  markets	  and	  free	  trade,	  among	  other	  things.	  The	  Washington	  Consensus	  had	  huge	  impacts	  in	  Latin	  America,	  where	  both	  leaders,	  like	  Chile’s	  Agosto	  Pinochet,	  and	  international	  organizations	  like	  the	  IMF,	  advocated	  its	  adoption	  in	  restructuring	  national	  economies	  away	  from	  more	  statist	  trends	  common	  in	  the	  60’s	  and	  70’s.	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is “an extensive experience with democracy, with the emergence of a left-of-center party 
that gains control of the legislative and executive branches, and the subsequent 
reformulation of social programs in a way that places expenditure emphasis on human 
capital formation and [efficient] transfer payments.” (Pribble et al. 2009: 393). In this 
situation, there would be more effective poverty reduction, while the absence of some or 
all of these factors will be less efficient.  
To test their hypothesis, they undertook a regression analysis, with poverty 
defined as a percentage of households living under the ECLAC2 poverty line as their 
dependent variable, with that data set including country-specific data from 1968-2001. 
For independent variables, they used several control variables that account for both 
economic and social explanations, as well as political variables measuring different 
aspects of government social spending, the survivability of democracy, and the 
ideological tendencies of governing institutions. Particularly, they measure democracy 
from Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens’ analysis of regimes in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. They create variables that measure political parties and their survivability 
and ideological outlook using Michael Coppedge’s project that coded parties that 
“contested elections for the lower houses or constituent assemblies in eleven Latin 
American states” (Pribble et al. 2009: 396). Finally, they used country studies to code 
countries based on the presence of highly repressive authoritarian regimes.  
After running the test, they came to several conclusions. First, they confirmed that 
their ideal-typical political sequence performs best in poverty reduction. They discussed 
various conclusions from the results of every variable they tested, some of which have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	  ECLAC	  is	  a	  regional	  commission	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  that	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  both	  poverty	  reduction	  and	  economic	  growth	  in	  Latin	  America.	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very important implications. They found that the presence of democracy positively and 
significantly affects poverty reduction, as does the presence of a left-leaning rather than 
right-leaning political program. They also found that education policy and direct cash 
transfers to poorer citizens have significant effects on poverty. They conclude strongly 
that there is a “significant impact of partisan power and regime type in shaping 
differences in poverty levels” (Pribble et al. 2009: 403). 
Yet more specifically, scholars have addressed the relationship between regime 
type and health outcomes in society. Muntaner, Borrell, Ng, Chung, Espelt, Rodriguez-
Sanz, Benach, and O’Canpo (2011), in an article for the journal Sociology of Health and 
Illness, conducted what can be termed a review of multiple comparative studies on 
political systems and health. The purpose of their article, rather than come up with more 
original research on the subject, is to “describe the emerging area of politically-oriented, 
empirical studies in the population health literature” (Muntaner et al. 2011: 947). This is 
significant: instead of trying to find very specific evidence relating to one small aspect of 
the relationship between democracy and health, they were looking for the big picture 
reflected in the totality of scholarship on the subject. 
In terms of methods, they searched several large publication databases, such as 
Sociological Abstracts, PubMed, and ISI Web of Science, for key words such as 
“democracy, welfare regime….AND health, health services, population health” 
(Muntaner et al. 2011: 949). After sifting through all the results to find seventy-three 
studies they determined to be fully relevant, they coded them based on year of 
publication, study objectives and hypotheses, study design, unit of analysis, political 
variables, health outcomes, and main findings. They were also coded based on the 
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direction of correlations of the empirical findings and their statistical significance. All the 
coded data were analyzed with basic descriptive and cross-tabulated statistics (Muntaner 
et al. 2011: 953) 
They concluded, “politics appears to have a positive effect on population health 
with leftist and egalitarian political traditions producing the most affirmative results. 
Advanced levels of democracy are consistently related to better population health…” 
(Muntaner et al. 2011: 954). They also find various levels of positive association between 
welfare states and population health and health inequalities, and “some evidence of 
deleterious effects” (Muntaner et al. 2011: 954) from globalization.  
Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia (2000), too, add quantitative support to these 
conclusions. They wrote their article “Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality” in 
an environment of competing academic arguments about the effects of regime type on the 
wellbeing of a country’s citizens. Three different schools of thought prevail, one that 
holds that “democracy facilitates economic and social development” (Zweifel and Navia 
2000: 100), another that holds the opposite, that democracy hinders these important 
aspects of growth, and a final school that holds that regime type has no real impact. 
Zweifel and Navia favored the first, particularly because they find problems with the 
assumptions given to support authoritarian advantage in provision of healthcare: they 
admonish, “the capacity for unilateral action does not inevitable foster the development 
of administrative infrastructures needed to provide public goods” (Zweifel and Navia 
2000: 101). They sought to use the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) to lend support to it, 
especially given that the IMR is closely tied to hunger as well as health indicators. 
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In terms of data and methods, they use the ACLP3 data set that contains periodic 
IMR data for 138 countries specifically from 1950-1990.  To balance for the fact that 
typically most democracies are richer and more developed than dictatorships, they used 
what is called the Heckman Two-Step method to predict a fictional IMR, were all the 
democracies dictatorships and all the dictatorships democracies: they “assume that every 
democracy observed in a given year existed simultaneously as a dictatorship, and vice 
versa” (104). They separate the cases by GDP per capita ($1000-$6000, in increments of 
$1000). 
They found that “infant mortality points to a clear pattern: With virtually no 
exceptions, democracies make their inhabitants better off than do dictatorships” and that 
“democracies have lower levels of infant mortality than dictatorships at every level of 
per-capita GDP” (Zweifel and Navia 2000: 109). They call it speculation, but they offer 
one tentative reason for this decisively clear trend. They say, “democracies are likely to 
provide their citizens with a wider array of opportunities. Opportunity may take many 
forms, including access to education, freedom from absentee landlords, the absence of 
war, the provision of credits and income, the freedom to space births, or simply a cow of 
one’s own. Opportunity gives people greater power to shape their own destiny, enabling 
them to be more self-sufficient” (Zweifel and Navia 2000: 109).  
Lastly, not only are there correlations between health and regime type; there is 
also evidence to suggest that higher levels of political inclusion and democratic 
governance within democracies are tied to better health outcomes. Thomas Fujiwara 
(2011) pointed to Brazil’s use of electronic voting as a factor in recent gains in maternal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Dataset	  created	  by	  Alvarez,	  Cheibub,	  Limongi,	  and	  Przeworski	  that	  contains	  political	  and	  economic	  data	  intended	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  formation	  and	  durability	  of	  democracies.	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health in several states. Describing the literature on the economic and social effects of 
enfranchisement as “mixed and puzzling,” Fujiwara’s research agenda was to show 
clearly “how improving the political participation of less educated voters can advance 
policies targeting them and affect their outcomes” (Fujiwara 2011: 1). The assumption is 
that politicians will be more responsive if barriers to voting are removed, especially to 
lower-income populations. He used data from the 1998 election when electronic voting 
(EV) was widely introduced in Brazil. Election rules specific to only this election 
mandated that only states meeting a certain population threshold, specifically 40,500 
voters, could use EV; this situation of differential implementation across states created 
the conditions to examine the effects of EV. He used a regression analysis to determine 
the effects of the election system on voting, and then employed several complicated 
mathematical models to determine the identity of voters who were enfranchised under the 
new voting system. He analyzed the use of the public healthcare system by uneducated 
mothers and birth data from the time period surrounding the change to EV. 
Fujiwara concludes from his results that EV “promoted the de-facto 
enfranchisement of mainly less educated voters” (Fujiwara 2011: 32). Crucially, it also 
“increased government spending in a service that particularly benefits less educated 
voters: health care…and had effects on its utilization and outcomes, increasing the 
number of prenatal visits and reducing the number of low-weight births by less educated 
mothers”(Fujiwara 2011: 32). Very clearly, the literature shows that not only regime type 
but also level of political inclusion affects health and health care issues. 
Scholars have thus studied the relationship between regime type and social 
spending not just on a global level, but regional level in Latin America as well. Although 
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not all countries being analyzed in this investigation are from Latin America—indeed, a 
majority are not—an analysis of the scholarship of democratic transition in this region is 
useful, not only because it is my chosen region of study, but also because it has been a 
region that has seen high levels of regime change, mainly from dictatorship to 
democracy, in the past 20-30 years, rivaled only by the early nineties in Eastern Europe.  
David Brown and Wendy Hunter (1999), examined the ways democracies and 
authoritarians react to economic constraints. Writing in a time when many scholars de-
emphasized the influence of regime type on social spending, they proposed directly 
testing the relationship between regime type and social spending in the period from 1980-
1992, when “many Latin American countries faced severe economic problems and 
underwent regime transitions that gave military and business elites unprecedented 
political influence” (Brown and Hunter 1999: 780). 
To test this, they examined a time-series, cross-sectional data set with 
observations from each country. To test whether democratic and authoritarian 
governments differ significantly in their responses to economic stimuli, they employed an 
“analysis of covariance” statistical model, with social spending per capita as the 
dependent variable and multiple economic indicators as complementary independent 
variables, including GDP per capita, Annual Percentage Growth in GDP, Debt Service 
Ratio, and Inflation, as well as a competing independent variable of Percentage of 
Population over 55. They categorized countries as democratic or authoritarian based on a 
measure developed by Alvarez, Cheribub, Limongi, and Przeworski, which itself is based 
on Robert Dahl’s 1971 classification. 
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From their regression analysis, they concluded that there exists a “clear and 
distinct pattern” between democracies and authoritarians. “Social spending in 
authoritarian regimes is relatively more sensitive to economic constraints, while in 
democracies it is relative more sensitive to political pressures” (Brown and Hunter 1999: 
748). Although they suggested that still much more research needs to be done to 
determine how both democracies and authoritarians are spending these resources and 
which groups of the population are receiving them, their results clearly suggested that 
structural factors in regime type affect social spending in Latin America. 
Kent Eaton (2001) adds to this idea of democracies being more responsive to their 
constituent in terms of social spending. Noticing a recent trend of Latin American 
experimentation with revenue decentralization, he examined the history of Argentina 
over the period from 1934-1999, specifically asking whether democratization or the 
election of democratic officials coincides with devolution of tax revenues to lower, 
democratically elected levels of governments. His hypothesis reflected this; he 
hypothesized that democratization is indeed associated with decentralization. He chose to 
focus on Argentina specifically to avoid having to account for the “cross-national 
variation…of wealth disparities…and the types of political parties and electoral rules 
employed in each” instead looking at “cross-temporal variation” (Eaton 2001: 2).  
After closely detailing each political administration in the 1934-99 period in 
Argentine history, examining the character of each regime and their attitudes and actions 
toward decentralization, he came to the conclusion that “with respect to the 
democratization hypothesis, the historical record in Argentina confirms the more general 
finding in the contemporary period that the democratic election of subnational officials 
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unleashes a powerful force for decentralization” (Eaton 2001: 16). This equally confirms 
a link between structural factors of regime type and social spending in Latin America: 
decentralization of government funds presumably puts financial resources closer to the 
recipients of social services, making it more likely that the quantity and quality of social 
services increase.  Decentralization, in itself, is a response to citizen desires, so this adds 
to the mounting evidence for political responsiveness being beneficial to the welfare of 
citizens. 
Lastly, DeRouen and Heo (2001) complement the two previous authors. They 
look at military dictatorships in Latin America with a critical eye to their success at 
modernization. After detailing several schools of thought on ways to approach the way 
the military in Latin America affected the economy and economic growth, they observed 
that “empirical findings from these previous studies lack consistency” (DeRouen and Heo 
2001: 481). To fill this gap in knowledge, they “propose[ed] and test[ed] a model capable 
of assessing the military’s role as modernizer in eighteen Latin American cases over time 
and cross nationally” (DeRouen and Heo 2001:481). 
They create what they call “a non-linear defense growth model” which takes into 
account what they see as the different avenues of growth for military economies, which 
they divide into three sectors “military, non-military, and private” (DeRouen and Heo 
2001: 482). They create a model based on Robert Solow’s “Technological Change and 
Aggregate Production Function,” which takes inputs of both economic and labor 
variables: they use economic and labor data from the IMF. They employ a “two-tiered 
research design” of, first, panel estimates and, second, individual longitudinal analysis, to 
capture both inter-country variation and variation over time. 
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Looking at the results of the statistical tests, DeRouen and Heo conclude that 
“technological progress in the region has indeed had a positive impact on growth,” while 
“military spending, by contrast, has thwarted growth” (DeRouen and Heo 2001: 496). 
Indeed, they go even further, concluding that “the military sector of the budget in Latin 
America has not made great strides in modernization since the early 1960’s” (DeRouen 
and Heo 2001: 496), owing this to the fact that counter-insurgency spending makes 
money spent on the military inefficient, as it could be much more productive spent on 
projects like public works or education. In general, their results confirm the relationship 
between social spending and regime type in Latin America, if only as a foil to research 
detailing the performance of democracy; it is clear from their research that military 
spending is a much less efficient way to improve the economy in Latin America than 
other methods, like technological progress. 
 
Hypotheses 
 Given all the scholarly treatment to this subject, I can come up with two 
hypotheses to test my questions.  
I) Regime type will correlate with improved healthcare system indicators. 
II) Regime type will be more statistically relevant than other variables in 
explaining variations in healthcare systems.  
  
A Chilean Flavor 
Before moving on to the methodology, tests, and analysis of the hypothesis, this 
investigation nevertheless could benefit from being rooted in the story of one particular 
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place as well as the data of many. Thus, I will imbue this thesis with the flavor of Chile’s 
story, in the way its government and healthcare system in particular reacted to changing 
climates of civil liberties and political rights during the most recent experience of 
democratic transition in the late 1980s. 
In the case of Chile, the armed forces, led by General Augusto Pinochet, moved 
against the polarizing civilian government of Salvador Allende in a 1973 coup d’état. 
After several years of brutal consolidation of power that included many “disappearings” 
and civil rights abuses, the Pinochet government wrote a new constitution in 1980, 
embarked on drastic neo-liberal economic reforms, privatized much, though not all, of 
state holdings not beneficial to the military. After several years of boom-and-bust 
economic performance and substantial protests in the mid-to-late 1980s, Pinochet was 
defeated in a 1988 plebiscite, following a successful campaign by the coalition opposition 
“Concertación por el No.” There was a transition to democracy, and Patricio Alywin was 
sworn in as president in 1990. Although the country transitioned to civilian rule, it is 
important to note that Pinochet and the military remained extremely influential; the 
military was guaranteed a certain number of seats in the Congress and Pinochet continued 
as commander of the armed forces and then as senator for life (Constable and Valenzuela 
1990). 
The story as it relates to the healthcare system is harder to tell, but there is some 
literature on healthcare under and after its dictatorship. Unger, Paepe, Cantuarias, and 
Herrera (2008) assess Chile’s healthcare infrastructure from the 1973 coup to 2005, 
paying a particularly close eye to the neoliberal reforms pushed through under Pinochet’s 
government. They argue that, although Chile’s reform has been held up as a model for 
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other countries undergoing similar processes of health overhaul, the reforms created a 
system with serious flaws that still remain. 
 In 1979, Pinochet’s government “embarked on a sweeping health sector reform 
based on neoliberal doctrines” (Unger et al. 2008: 542). Particularly, they took the old, 
completely public health care system developed over previous regimes and changed it to 
a dual public private system made up of two separate, parallel administrations, ISAPRES, 
the private, and FONASA, the public. ISAPRES offered health care insurance based on 
an employer-contribution system, while FONASA functioned as a public system mostly 
used by those who could not afford the higher prices of private insurance. According to 
the authors, the duality of the system created several effects, including negative effects on 
income inequality and inequitable access to quality health providers for those in the 
public system. Also, the ISAPRES system “hardly contained costs,” as the system was 
“never intended to do so…and [its companies] have few incentives to be efficient buyers 
of health services for their clients” (Unger et al. 2008: 545). 
 With democratization, financing of FONASA, the public health component, 
increased substantially, as public healthcare spending data makes clear. However, the 
authors point out that “the democratic regime did not modify the essence of Pinochet’s 
reform…[and] key features…still exist” (Unger et al. 2008: 546). Although Chile has 
fairly good health indicators for its GNP and size, they attribute this to the growth rate 
and successful reduction in poverty instead of the healthcare system itself. However, it 
must be noted that the new, democratic regime behaved in the way hypothesized by my 
paper; they have been more responsive to citizen demands, and this can be seen in 
increased funding in FONASA during the democratic regime, among other things.  
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 The story of Chile as it moved from military dictatorship to democracy reflects 
the literature well. Ultimately, Pinochet and the democratic governments under Alywin, 
Frei, and Lagos that followed behaved fundamentally differently because of the 
institutional structures and their accountability to the populace (or lack of it). Pinochet 
could push through the drastic neoliberal reforms in the late 70’s and early 80’s because 
he did not consider himself constrained by, or responsible to, public opinion; the 
following democratically-elected presidents, on the other hand, increased funding to 
FONASA precisely because it was the will of the people who elected them.  
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Methods and Data 
 
 
Data 
 I will now undertake a brief description of my data and case selection. First, my 
dataset includes data for nearly all of the 191 countries listed in the Freedom House 
report for 2008. I chose to analyze the data from the year 2008 for a simple reason: it was 
the most recent year for which the necessary amount of data was present. More recent 
years had data available for some indicators, but not for all countries, and definitely not 
to the same extent as was present for 2008.  Even so, I excluded 8 countries due to the 
unavailability of data for Healthcare Spending and Physician Density. The excluded 
countries are Liechtenstein, North Korea, Somalia, the Palestinian Territories, Zimbabwe, 
Argentina, Jamaica, Myanmar, and Syria. These exclusions warrant discussion as to any 
possibility of their exclusion skewing the results: indeed, many of them have either 
undemocratic regimes or failed states. However, given that there is plenty of other 
variation present in my dataset among regime types, this exclusion should not have a 
significant effect. Indeed, it might actually help improve the quality of my dataset, as any 
data coming out of these countries, with the exception of Liechtenstein, Argentina, and 
Jamaica, is most likely less reliable because of the nature of the ruling regime, or lack 
thereof. 
 Before continuing on to my variables, a discussion of the case selection is 
warranted. A possible critique of including such a wide range of countries -- from nearly 
failed states, like Iraq, to incredibly safe and prosperous ones, like Norway, -- is the wide 
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gap of conditions between the two could make any comparison between them irrelevant. 
Why not select a similar group of countries and do a more small-scale and focused 
comparison? The reasoning behind my inclusion of as many countries as possible is that 
selecting countries of similar conditions would inevitably limit the range of variation of 
political rights and civil liberties between them. As the purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate the link between regime type and health, it is not only useful, but imperative, 
to have as wide a range as possible.  
 Having established my case selection, I will now turn to describing how I will 
measure my dependent variable of healthcare system. I have three indicators that, in 
conjunction, should give a fairly accurate picture of a country’s healthcare system: Infant 
Mortality Rate (IMR), Healthcare Spending as a Percentage of GDP (HCS), and 
Physician Density (PD). Each of these indicators measures the character of a different 
part of the healthcare system: its effectiveness (IMR), government and private investment 
(HCS), and its depth and pervasiveness (PD). I detail each indicator below. The data for 
each variable, independent or dependent, comes from 2008, as that was the most recent 
year with consistent data available. 
 The Infant Mortality Rate indicator is obtained from the World Bank, which 
defines it as “the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live 
births in a given year.” Accordingly, the scale is infant deaths per 1,000. The World Bank 
gets these numbers, it says, from “estimates developed by the UN Inter-agency Group for 
Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DESA Population 
Division),” and I obtained these numbers through the Data section of Worldbank.org. 
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 Infant Mortality, although ultimately an indicator of health outcomes, is very 
useful for analyzing the effectiveness of healthcare systems because of all the factors that 
affect it. According to the Encyclopedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development, 
IMR is a reflection of the provision of “inexpensive [but important] measures such as 
nutritional support to the pregnant mother, access to clean water, immunization against 
childhood infectious diseases, provision of a skilled attendant at birth, treatment of 
diarrhea and dehydration with oral rehydration fluid, and implementation of malarial 
control measures” (Andrews et al. 2008, 343). It is logical, then, to assume that countries 
with lower infant mortality rates have healthcare systems that are more able to provide 
maternal, pediatric, and, crucially, preventative care to larger portions of their 
populations than those with higher IMRs. 
 Healthcare Spending as a Percentage of GDP (HCS) is another indicator obtained 
from the World Bank. The organization defines it as “the sum of public and private health 
expenditure. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family 
planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does 
not include provision of water and sanitation.” The scale is in constant 2006 USD, but is 
represented as a percentage relative to a country’s overall GDP. The World Bank 
obtained these numbers from the World Health Organization Healthcare Account 
database, and I received this data from the Data section of Worldbank.org. 
 The logic for including HCS as an indicator of healthcare systems is simple: 
countries that spend more on their healthcare systems relative to their overall economic 
wealth should prioritize health to a higher degree. Countries that prioritize their 
healthcare should logically have better and more accessible healthcare systems. 
23	  
Lastly, Physician Density is the third measure of my dependent variable. It comes 
from the World Health Organization, which defines it as the “number of physicians 
relative to the size of the population.” Accordingly, the scale is in physicians per 1000 
population. According to the WHO, it is compiled using 4 major sources: population 
censuses, labor force and employment surveys, health facility assessments and routine 
administrative information systems.” I obtained this data from WHO.int, specifically 
from its Indicator and Measurement Registry. It must be noted, though, that this data is 
closest estimation: the WHO dataset contained data for every country, but for 2008, in 
several cases data was not available. Thus, if no data was available for 2008, data from 
the closest year was used. Most data lies within 3-4 years of 2008, which should not 
cause significant skewing of the results, as there should not be dramatic differences in the 
number of doctors in such a short range of years. The largest difference between 
collection year and 2008 was 8 years. 
The more physicians there are in a country relative to its population, the more 
patients they should be able to see. Thus, the assumption is that a country with more 
physicians will have fewer citizens out of reach of medical care and, thus, a deeper and 
more pervasive healthcare system. This assumption is certainly not perfect, because other 
factors such as healthcare costs also affect citizens’ ability to see a doctor. However, on a 
global scale, the assumption that more physicians per capita leads to more pervasive 
healthcare access is not an unreasonable one. 
 In addition to the three dependent variable measures, my dataset includes six 
independent variables, with one main variable, Freedom House’s Freedom Rating, and 
five other competing independent variables, GDP per capita, Latitude (Absolute Value) 
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of Capitals, Major Episodes of Political Violence in the Preceding Ten Years, Rural 
Population as a Percentage of Population, and Net Official Development Assistance 
Received as a Percentage of Population. I will expound on each of these in the section 
that follows. 
 My main independent variable is the Freedom House Freedom Rating (FHR). It is 
an indicator that measures the political and social climate of a country with a particular 
eye towards political and civil freedoms. Freedom House, founded in New York in 1941 
and co-chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, describes itself as “an independent watchdog 
organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world” 
(Freedomhouse.org: “About Us”). Since 1972, it has conducted a yearly survey of global 
civil liberties and political rights, Freedom in the World, from which comes its annual 
Freedom Rating for 193 countries. The Freedom Rating is an average of two sub-scores, 
the first for Civil Liberties, defined as the ability “to participate freely in the political 
process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, 
compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect 
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the 
electorate” (Freedom in the World 2008). The other is Political Rights, defined as 
“freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy without interference from the state” (Freedom in the World 
2008). These two indicators are then averaged to get the Freedom Rating. The scale of 
the indicator is from 1-7, with 1 indicating most free and 7 indicating least free. Thus, a 
lower number indicate a more democratic regime, while a higher number indicates a 
more authoritarian one.  
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The data were collected by Freedom House and are a result of surveys given to a 
team of 33 analysts and 16 senior-level academic advisors, some in the New York and 
others abroad.  Each expert answers twenty-five questions, ten on political rights and 
fifteen on civil liberties. The raw scores are compiled and the total scores are used to rank 
the countries. I obtained the data from the “Freedom in the World: 2008” report found at 
Freedomhouse.org. It must be noted, for full disclosure, that Freedom House “operates 
from the assumption that freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic 
societies” (Freedom in the World 2008). 
Based on the context of the literature review and my hypotheses, as the Freedom 
House score decreases, one would expect the healthcare system to get better: that is, the 
infant mortality would fall, and physician density and healthcare spending would 
increase. 
 My first competing independent variable is GDP per capita (GDP). I obtained this 
data from the World Bank, which defines the indicator as the “gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.” Its scale is in 
thousands (1,000) of constant 2005 USD. I obtained the data from the Data tab of 
Worldbank.org. 
 I selected this competing variable to test whether the economic strength was a 
more significant determinant of health; indeed, in my research, many studies seemed to 
suggest this. The logic makes sense: more money, more investment in health. One would 
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expect that, as GDP per capita rises, healthcare would improve. In addition, including this 
variable in the analysis controls for the correlation between health of citizens and 
economic strength of countries. 
 My second competing independent variable is the Absolute Value of the Latitude 
of each country’s capital city. This is simply a measure of the relative distance of each 
country’s capital city from the equator, and the scale is in degrees, measured to a 
certainty of +/- 0.5°. I obtained the Atlas of the World, 2007 ed. I selected this variable to 
examine whether geographical location has a significant impact on health. Latitude is an 
indicator that captures a lot of variation in a country’s physical environment. The climate, 
the ecological surrounding, and, specifically, the prevalence of tropical diseases all vary 
with latitude. It is a clumsy indicator—many other things besides the ones listed above 
change with each degree of latitude—but it is still useful in assessing the degree to which 
the climatic and ecological surroundings affect health. 
 The third competing independent variable is Major Episode of Political Violence 
in Preceding 10 Years (PV). The data comes from the Virginia-based Center for Systemic 
Peace and is collected annually by its director, Dr. Monty G. Marshall, former Director of 
Research for the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University and the director of 
the Polity IV project, which “provides annual assessments of autocracy, democracy, and 
regime transitions”(“About,” systemicpeace.org). According to the Center, “a Major 
Episode of Political Violence involves at least 500 ‘directly-related’ fatalities and reaches 
a level of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained (a base 
rate of 100 ‘directly-related deaths per annum’).” The scale is binary: 1 represents the 
presence of a Major Episode in the years 1998-2008, while 0 represents the absence of an 
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event. I obtained this data directly from the Center for Systemic Peace’s website. This 
indicator was selected to give an indication of the effect of conflict on healthcare 
systems: countries with active conflicts should see worse healthcare system indicators, as 
resources would be diverted away from health services to the more immediate costs of 
conflict, not to mention the enormous toll, both in injuries and in the disruption of 
preventative care, that conflict takes on populations. 
The fourth competing independent variable is Rural Population as Percentage of 
Population. I again obtained this data from the World Bank, which defines the rural 
population as “people living in rural areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is 
calculated as the difference between total population and urban population.” The scale is 
between 0 and 100%. I obtained the data from the Data tab on Worldbank.org. This 
variable was selected to see whether the degree of urbanization, and, by extension, the 
degree of centralization of provision of goods and services, has any impact on healthcare 
systems. One should expect to see lower percentages of rural population (or higher 
percentages of urban population) associated with better healthcare outcomes, as people 
are more likely in places where they can have access to healthcare resources. I decided to 
include Rural Population as an indicator for the same reason as Latitude: it is a measure 
of the conditions that citizens live in, although this indicator measures societal and 
infrastructural conditions rather than climactic and ecological ones. 
The last competing independent variable is Net Official Development Assistance 
Received per Capita. The data comes from the World Bank, which adds, “Net official 
development assistance (ODA) per capita consists of disbursements of loans made on 
concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the 
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members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, 
and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries 
and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients; and is calculated by dividing net ODA 
received by the midyear population estimate. It includes loans with a grant element of at 
least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent).” The scale is in Current 
USD. I obtained this indicator from the Data tab on Worldbank.org. I chose this variable 
to assess whether economic strength is a factor in determining healthcare system strength; 
this indicator is sufficiently different from GDP, though, because it measures wealth 
coming from an external source, rather than a domestic one. The assumption is that 
higher levels of official development assistance would boost the resources a country has 
to spend, increasing healthcare spending and ultimately outcomes. 
As a refresher, I had two hypotheses: 
I) Regime type will correlate with improved healthcare system indicators. 
II) Regime type will be more statistically relevant than other variables in 
explaining variations in healthcare systems.  
My mix of variables is well suited to analyze these two hypotheses. First, the 
dependent variables effectively cover several crucial aspects of healthcare systems, health 
outcomes (the IMR), investment (Healthcare Spending), and the depth and pervasiveness 
of the system (Physician Density). Second, my main independent variable, Freedom 
House Rating, is a good choice because it approximates, in a clear and systematic way, 
the democratic nature of every regime worldwide. Finally, my competing variables offer 
several other plausible and varied alternatives to put my main independent variable in 
context. 
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Methods 
To test my hypothesis, I ran three multiple-regression analyses, one for each 
dependent variable measurement using SPSS software. The program uses a least-squares 
fit, determining the equation of a line that minimizes the variance between data-points. 
Not only does it determine the line, but also calculates standard error, from which 
confidence intervals and p-values are calculated. From that result, I compared the 
strength of the correlations between the dependent variables and both main and 
competing independent variables.  
In the analysis, I look at several things in particular. First, I examine the R2 value 
of each of the regressions. The R2 value measures how well the artificial line drawn by 
the regression analysis fits all of my points: the closer each data-point is to the line, the 
higher the R2 value. Thus, the R2 value measures how well my trend line fits the actual 
data set. A higher value indicates the presence of a real correlation, while a lower value, 
below .2 or .3, casts some doubt on the reliability of the correlations found by the model. 
Second, I carefully note statistical significance. The regression model calculates 
the probability that each correlation between variables is due to chance: a lower 
probability (p) that it is due to chance, below .01, or 1%, for instance, indicates that there 
is only a 1% chance that the independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable is 
due to chance. I evaluate each of my variables on their statistical significance and the 
degree of the significance is displayed using asterisks next to the coefficient; one asterisk 
(*) shows statistical significance (p is less that 1%), while three (***) signifies a very 
significant result (p is less than 0.1%). This matters primarily because only variables that 
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are statistically significant are statistically relevant predictors of the dependent variable 
indicators. 
Lastly, the coefficient of the correlation is important: the coefficient indicates the 
magnitude and direction of the independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable. A 
coefficient of 2 signifies that for every one-unit rise of the independent variable, there is a 
two-unit rise of the dependent variable. A coefficient of -2, on the other hand, means that 
for every 2 units the independent variable falls, there is a 1 unit rise in the dependent 
variable. I will note here that only statistically significant coefficients will be discussed: 
although the lack of statistical significance of a variable is important in and of itself, the 
coefficient is irrelevant. 
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Results and Analysis 
Results 
Table 1: Infant Mortality 
Dependent 
Variable Independent Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Infant Mortality 
Rate Freedom House Rating 2.462* (-0.909) 
  GDP per Capita† -0.0513 (0) 
  Latitude -0.44*** (0.103) 
  Presence of Political Violence 10.514* (3.716) 
  Rural Population 0.408*** (0.078) 
  Official Development Assistance per Capita -0.005 (0.006) 
    R2 0.502 
    F 31.593 
*p<.01; **p<.005; ***p<.001     
All three analyses came back with interesting results. First, Infant Mortality Rate 
(IMR). When run with all the independent variables, four of the coefficients were 
significant, the Freedom House Rating, Political Violence, Latitude, and Percentage of 
Rural Population: the latter two were highly significant. Freedom House scores, Political 
Violence, and Rural Population all had positive multiple-regression coefficients with the 
IMR. For every one-point rise in the Freedom House Rating, the IMR rose 2.4 deaths per 
10,000 births, holding constant all other independent variables, and for every percentage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  †	  The scale has been adjusted to make the result more understandable. The original regression was 
performed with a scale of $1 USD, instead of $1,000: the original regression coefficient was -5.13*10-5	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rise in Rural Population the IMR rose 0.41 deaths per 10,000. Latitude, however, has a 
negative multiple-regression coefficient; for every degree fall in latitude, the IMR rises 
0.44 deaths per 10,000, holding constant all other variables.  The R2 value is fairly high, 
signifying that the model fits the reality of the data fairly well.  
 These results are noteworthy for several reasons. First, Freedom House Score is 
confirmed to be a statistically relevant predictor of a healthcare system indicator. This 
supports my first hypothesis. Secondly, though, several other variables, notably Latitude 
and Rural Population, are much more statistically relevant to the change of the dependent 
variable; these are counter to my second hypothesis, as they are more significant than the 
FHR. Lastly, it is interesting to note that GDP per capita and Official Development 
Assistance, both monetary variables, were not statistically relevant predictors of the IMR. 
Table 2: Healthcare Spending 
Dependent 
Variable Independent Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Healthcare 
Spending Freedom House Rating -0.632*** (.110) 
  GDP per Capita† -0.0416 (.000) 
  Latitude 0.034* (.013) 
  Presence of Political Violence 0.731 (.451) 
  Rural Population 0.005 (.009) 
  Official Development Assistance per Capita 0.002** (.001) 
    R2 0.263 
    F 11.83 
*p<.01; **p<.005; ***p<.001    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  †	  The scale has been adjusted to make the result more understandable. The original regression was 
performed with a scale of $1 USD, instead of $1,000: the original regression coefficient was -4.16*10-5	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Next comes Healthcare Spending (HCS). Three of the independent variables have 
significant multiple-regression coefficients: Freedom House Scores, Latitude, and 
Official Development Assistance. FHR’s coefficient was negative: as a country’s score 
falls 1 point (more democratic), Healthcare Spending rises by 0.63% of GDP. The other 
two, Latitude and ODA, have positive multiple-regression coefficients. As latitude 
increases 1 degree (one degree farther from the equator), the percentage of GDP spent on 
healthcare rises 0.034%, while as ODA increases by $1, it rises by 0.002%. However, this 
regression has a relatively low R2 value of 0.263: the model does not fit this data as 
clearly and consistently as the other two regressions, but .263 is still an acceptable level 
for political science research. 
 This regression has important implications. First, the Freedom-House Rating is a 
highly statistically relevant predictor (p<.001). This is especially noteworthy, considering 
that it is the only independent variable to have that level of significant correlation among 
this regression. Indeed, this result is incredibly interesting because Healthcare Spending 
is the only variable that shows the immediate actions of governments: the other two 
dependent variable measures show longer-term consequences of those actions. This 
supports my first hypothesis well, showing that more democratic countries invest 
significantly more in their healthcare and healthcare systems. Also, it is important to 
mention that Latitude, again, pops up as statistically relevant predictor of a healthcare 
system indicator. A country’s latitude, according to the model, is a statistically relevant 
predictor of how much a country spends on healthcare. It could simply be a reflection of 
the fact that European countries, which spend lots on healthcare, are all at fairly high 
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latitudes: however, the fact that latitude consistently pops up as significant in all the tests 
is notable. 
Table 3: Physician Density 
Dependent 
Variable Independent Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Physician Density Freedom House Rating 0.034 (.041) 
  GDP per Capita† 0.0196*** (.000) 
  Latitude 0.042*** (.005) 
  Presence of Political Violence -0.109 (.168) 
  Rural Population -0.019*** (.004) 
  Official Development Assistance per Capita .000016 (.000) 
    R2 0.668 
    F 62.125 
*p<.01; **p<.005; ***p<.001    
 Lastly, Physician Density (PD). Three independent variables have significant 
multiple-regression coefficients: GDP per Capita, Latitude, and Percentage of Rural 
Population. GDP and LAT have positive coefficients: a $1,000 raise in GDP/capita 
correlates to a 0.0196 rise in physician density, while a 1 degree change in Latitude leads 
to a 0.042 rise. Rural population correlates negatively: with every percentage rise of 
population living in rural areas, the Physician density falls .019. It should be noted that 
the R2 value for this test is extremely high, at .668, especially considering that this is in 
the field of political science. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  †	  The scale has been adjusted to make the result more understandable. The original regression was 
performed with a scale of $1 USD, instead of $1,000: the original regression coefficient was 1.96*10-5	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 This regression has interesting implications for the conclusion. First, FHR, the 
Main Independent Variable, was not significantly correlated to PD, the indicator of the 
depth and pervasiveness of the healthcare system. This result does not support my 
hypothesis: one would assume that as countries become more democratic, they would 
provide more opportunities for their citizens to access physicians. Secondly, GDP shows 
up here as highly significant; in the other two indicators, it did not have any significant 
correlation. This is an interesting result: although GDP did not play a part in affecting 
healthcare outcomes, it does affect the depth and pervasiveness of the system. Lastly, 
Rural Population shows up as highly significant: this makes sense, as rural populations 
generally have a lower density of goods and services. 
 
Analysis 
 The results of the three regression analyses together, as hoped, have clear 
implications for the hypothesis put forward earlier in this paper. First, it is clear that 
democracy is a fairly statistically relevant predictor of a better healthcare system, 
supporting my first hypothesis. For two of the three health-related dependent variables, 
the statistical test is clear that there is a significant relationship. Indeed, HCS, the only 
dependent variable measure that measures government action, instead of long-term 
consequences, is affected by FHR with a high significance. Secondly, though, other 
competing variables are clearly equally or more statistically relevant than the Freedom 
House score. Rural Population correlates with two of the three health indicators as well, 
and, surprisingly, latitude was the only factor significant in all three variables. These 
variables tend to be more of a measure of the conditions that people live in, rather than 
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government action. For instance, countries at lower latitudes (closer to the equator) are 
known for having more tropical diseases like malaria which clearly could impact health, 
while countries with higher percentages of rural population probably have larger 
percentages of their populations outside of social-service delivery networks that are more 
easily developed in densely-packed cities than in the more sparse countryside. This result 
does not support my second hypothesis, suggesting an opposite conclusion: that other 
factors instead of regime type are statistically more responsible for the health of 
countries’ citizens. Third, presence of violence did not statistically explain variations in 
healthcare system indicators: although it meets the lowest criteria for significance on the 
IMR regression, its coefficients are on balance not significant predictors of either 
improvements or decays in healthcare systems. Lastly, it is important to note that the 
economic independent variables, GDP per capita and Official Direct Investment, did 
relatively poor jobs at explaining variations in healthcare systems. This is hugely contrary 
to expectations, as the effect of money on healthcare is perceived to be very large. 
 
The Chilean Context 
 While the benefit of conducting such a broad, international analysis is the breadth 
of political rights and civil liberties that can be analyzed, there is something lost: the 
depth of individual countries’ experiences, represented in a more descriptive form than a 
one-year regression analysis. Thus, yet again, I will delve into the particular experience 
of Chile, as to add some depth to this discussion.  
 How did healthcare fare under the Pinochet regime as compared to the democratic 
government that followed it? There is very little data from before Chile’s transition to 
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democracy in 1990. Indeed, having spent my semester abroad trying to find data sources 
for this thesis, it was hard to find any published data, governmental or otherwise, 
stretching farther back than 2000. However, one of my independent variable measures, 
Infant Mortality Rate, stretches all the way back to before the coup in 1973. Taking a 
look at this country-specific data in time series could provide a complimentary 
perspective on the regression analysis used above. If the results of my analysis above are 
consistent with Chile’s experience, one would expect to see a noticeable decline in the 
IMR after Chile’s government changed from dictatorship to democracy. However, one 
would also expect that other factors completely unrelated to regime type be at play. 
Before taking a look at the graph, it is important to note that this data and analysis are 
much less statistically developed than would be expected for a thesis: this is because I am 
simply offering this data as a complement to the conclusions reached from the more 
rigorous test performed above, rather than a fully new line of research into the topic. 
 
 
Graph 1 
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 As can be clearly seen in the graph, the Infant Mortality Rate falls much faster 
under Pinochet’s regime as compared to the following democratic one. This does not 
necessarily mean that the Pinochet regime was more effective at providing care to its 
citizens than the democratic regime was: citing the Encyclopedia of Infant and Early 
Childhood Development, “infant mortality in developed countries first improved when 
standards of living increased and infectious disease mortality decreased. More recently, 
advances in obstetric and neonatal care for high-risk pregnancies and premature infants 
have reduced [it]” (Andrews et al. 2008, 343). That seems to have happened here: a swift 
downward slope in the IMR suddenly flattens out but still decreases, implying that further 
improvement in the IMR takes more technological advances and expensive equipment 
than previous advances. Even seeing this though, note the time of transition. Before the 
transition, the IMR almost completely levels out but, as the country crosses over into 
democracy, the IMR begins to have a slight, but noticeable, downward slope.  
This result adds support to the results of the regression analysis. Regime type 
appears to be a factor: around the time of the transition to democracy, the IMR began a 
noticeable decline after years of stagnation. However, regime type is obviously less 
important than other factors in the provision and effectiveness of healthcare, as made 
obvious by the huge declines seen in the Pinochet years. Other factors, presumably 
urbanization and modernization, which were ongoing in Chile at the time and are 
consistent with the Rural Population indicator, are most likely more important in driving 
this change than regime type. 
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Conclusions 
 
Conclusion 
 The results of my research speak clearly to my two hypotheses: there is a 
relationship between democracy and healthcare systems, confirming my first hypothesis, 
but, contrary to my second hypothesis, other factors, like latitude and percentage of rural 
population, were more consistently significant than democracy. This leads to several 
interesting conclusions. First, these results deepen the understanding of the relationship 
between democracy and health. As discussed in the literature review, several scholars 
have examined the relationship before, but most of these have used binary classifications 
that define regimes as either democracies or authoritarians. The results of this paper 
confirm this correlation between democracy and healthcare while, at the same time, doing 
so with a more fluid definition of democracy that puts regimes on a gradient between 
extremes of democratic and non-democratic regimes. This ensures that these conclusions 
extend not only to the poster-children of democracies and authoritarians, like Norway and 
North Korea, but to the countries in the gray area in-between the two that are neither fully 
democratic or fully authoritarian, like Venezuela or Nigeria.  
Secondly, my results put into perspective this link between democracy and health. 
Although democracy was shown to be a significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable indicators, other indicators that reflect more immediate living conditions, like 
latitude and the percentage of rural population (conversely a measure of urbanization), 
are more significant. This suggests that improvements in health are more related to 
improvements in the conditions in which people live rather than changes in the economic 
or political conditions in a country. Lastly, the relatively low degree of correlation 
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between the economic competing variable indicators, GDP per Capita and Official Direct 
Investment, is surprising and somewhat counter-intuitive. This result is extremely 
surprising: given the impact that wealth is expected to have in healthcare, the absence of 
a significant relationship between these and both infant mortality rate and the money 
spent on healthcare flies in the face of the way one would expect the world to work. 
Further research would be needed to confirm these findings and put them into perspective 
and this result is by no means definitive, but it could lead to an interesting dialogue on the 
importance of wealth in healthcare. 
 These results logically lead to new perspectives on the improvement of healthcare 
on a global scale. First, it adds one more benefit to democracy in the realm of citizen 
welfare. Democracies have long been noted to correlate with many positive indicators 
like higher GDP, but their statistically significant relationship to healthcare-related 
factors like infant mortality and healthcare spending add one more benefit to improving 
political liberties and civil rights. However, the fact that environmental variables like 
latitude and percentage of rural population are more statistically relevant leads to the 
logical conclusion that efforts to improve the ecological and infrastructural conditions in 
which people live, like combating tropical diseases and increasing access to clean sources 
of water, will more efficiently improve healthcare than giving foreign aid or prompting 
regime change. This leads to a new perspective on the literature cited in the literature 
review. Although democracies have higher levels of social spending and are more 
responsive to citizen demands, other factors, like improving the conditions in which 
people live, are more important in improving healthcare. 
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Latin American Implications 
This study has huge implications for Latin America as well. First, it reinforces the 
importance of regime type. If democracy is a statistically relevant predictor of better 
healthcare systems, then one would expect that democratization in the region would lead 
to better health for citizens. In a region that has routinely witnessed non-democratic 
governance of all types, from military dictatorships to semi-authoritarian states with non-
competitive elections, this is one more reason to demand real development and protection 
of political rights and civil liberties. Secondly, because the most significant results of this 
analysis were those that measured, among other things, the natural and infrastructural 
environment in which people live, this study confirms that huge gains in healthcare can 
be gained even without changing the regime type of countries. Cheap but effective efforts 
to combat tropical diseases and increasing access to infrastructure, two elements of the 
Latitude and Percentage of Rural Population indicators, can be gained without changing 
the regime (even though democratic governments would theoretically prioritize these 
objectives). Lastly, monetary variables were by-and-large less significant than regime-
type and environmental variables. A direct application of this would be a larger emphasis 
on US policy being concerned with helping directly build infrastructure and increase 
access to healthcare, rather than giving non-specific aid to poorer countries. 
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